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WHAT FRANCE 

HAS DONE 

IN THE 

WAR 



Prepared by 

THE INFORMATION BUREAU 

OF THE 

FRENCH HIGH COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

1919 



/ 



WHAT FRANCE 

HAS DONE 

IN THE 

WAR 






Prepared by 
THE INFORMATION BUREAU 

OF THE 

FRENCH HIGH COMMISSION 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 

1919 



» » 

J J J 






IS. ©f jB 

NOV 5 , ' 



IT is customary, in speaking of France, to praise the valor 
of her soldiers. Their heroism was a part of French tradi- 
tion ; it has surprised no on€. The surprise began when the 
world saw France not merely fighting with her old-time "fury," 
but organizing her warfare and making ready for a long 
struggle. 

The part played by France in the war has been, above all, to 
cover the preparations of her Allies. By virtue of her geograph- 
ical situation and of historical conditions, she was the first of the 
Allies to be prepared, the "chief enemy," as the Kaiser said. To 
her, throughout the war, fell the task of gaining time while the 
new armies of the Allies were being assembled, at first in Great 
Britain, then in America. The role of France was therefore to 
hold, until the arrival of the divisions sent by Kitchener and the 
divisions led by Pershing. 

As the war progressed, the feats of valor, of which even our 
enemies were willing to esteem us capable, were no longer suffi- 
cient. There developed the need of virtues not commonly re- 
garded as French: patience, perseverance, work, unity. What 
was the opinion of France commonly held in 1914.? That the 
race was wearied; the industries behind the times; the nation 
hopelessly divided by political dissensions. This was the opinion 
held by our enemies, perhaps by some of our friends as well. 

Since then the facts have spoken for themselves. 

I. — France In Arms 
Let the reader picture to himself the march of the mass of 
the German troops in 1914 through devastated Belgium, then, 
after the first battles, the advance on French soil. It is not only 
a vast army, 1,500,000 men, but the most colossal assemblage 
of the machinery of death that half a century of industrial ef- 
fort, at a cost of billions of dollars, could create: 4,000 field 
cannon, 450 heavy batteries, 700 heavy howitzers, not to speak 
of machine-guns, of armored cars mounted with machine-guns 



and with cannon, of Zeppelins and airplanes. With this mighty 
instrument it is planned to subjugate the world. "Paris to- 
morrow !" the German officers cry, as they pass through a village 
on the Meuse. Paris taken means France overpowered before 
Russia and England can enter the conflict; it means Europe 
dominated by terror and the world under German hegemony. 

It was then that between the 6th and 12th of September the 
French army, aided by the six divisions of the British army, 
made its stand at the Mame and hurled back the German armies 
of invasion. 

The Marne. — After the battle of Charleroi (August 23rd), 
General Joffre faced these alternatives: he might continue stub- 
bornly a battle accepted under unfavorable conditions, without 
strategic initiative, at a distance from his reserves — or refusing 
battle, he might remove the mass of the French armies to a new 
position at which the reserves of all France could be concen- 
trated, and during this retreat, which would prevent his being 
enveloped, form a new army at his left by transporting troops 
from the east to the region of Paris, and attempt in his turn to 
recover the strategic initiative and to envelop his adversary. 

Joff re's course of action was as follows : he ordered a retreat, 
a retreat which was disastrous because it yielded to the enemy 
French territory, mines, and factories, but which was indispen- 
sable because it gave us time and space and because it deceived 
the Germans. Von Kluck pursued, engaged battle, and instead 
of covering his right flank, risked a movement to the northeast 
of Paris without discovering the danger that menaced him. 
Joffre profited by this mistake to hurl the army of Maunoury 
against the German right flank at the same time that he ordered 
the renewal of the offensive on the morning of the 6th. On the 
12th, after six days of desperate combat on the entire front, the 
enemy, exhausted and fearing an irreparable disaster, aban- 
doned the conflict, retreated from the field, and entrenched on 
the line of the Aisne. 



Flanders. — But Germany was not conquered. She was to 
renew her attacks and repeat her blows. While the French com- 
mander-in-chief was seeking to envelop the German right wing, 
the enemy was extending that wing and was soon to reinforce 
it with an entire army organized in Germany. In this "race to 
the sea," in which the French commander had the initiative, but 
the enemy soon had the advantage in numbers, Foch, charged 
with "co-ordinating the operations of the Allies," revealed him- 
self as a veritable leader of composite forces. Here he was op- 
posed to the Kaiser himself, commanding in person. William 
II had not succeeded in making a triumphal entry either into 
Paris or into Nancy; he now dreamed of entering Ypres and 
there proclaiming the annexation of Belgium and of seizing the 
maritime bases of Flanders. It was his express desire, he said, 
that his troops should be in Ypres on November 1st. 

The battle was begun on October 23rd and continued until 
November 11th. The German offensive was launched with con- 
siderable forces from southeast of Ypres to the sea. The British 
divisions of General Sir Douglas Haig, with French territorial 
divisions and cavalry, opposed a splendid resistance. Foch rein- 
forced them successively with five French army corps. Finally 
the offensive of the Yser was broken. In two months the French 
army had twice arrested the progress of the German army. 

1915. — Then began the long period of waiting in the 
trenches that were dug from Nieuport to Altkirch. The French 
army mounted guard, while Kitchener in silence prepared his 
armies. Then, since in this year, Germany was directing her 
principal effort against Russia, the French army, acting in con- 
cert with the English army, took the offensive on May 9th in 
Artois, on September 25th in Artois and in Champagne, to force 
the common enemy to diminish his pressure toward the east and 
to recall his divisions to the western front. It was a year of 
waiting, of organization, of preparation. 

1916, Verdun. — Disquieted by the formation of Kitchener's 



army, Germany decided to direct her effort once more against the 
west. Her project at the beginning of 1916 was to annihilate or to 
exhaust the French army in single combat before the new Eng- 
lish armies were ready to bring aid. The German offensive be- 
gan before Verdun on February 25, 1916, and lasted till July. 
Never before had Germany concentrated at one point so much 
material and so many men — a colossal but vain effort, frustrated 
by the energy of Generals Petain, Nivelle, and Mangin, and by 
the resolution of the sixty-two divisions which in turn came to 
defend the fortress between February and July. 

Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, could say later, 
in the citadel of Verdun: "The memory of the victorious resist- 
ance of Verdun will be immortal, for Verdun has saved not only 
France but the whole of the great cause which is common to our- 
selves and humanity. . . . 

"I am deeply moved when I tread this sacred soil, and I do 
not speak for myself alone. I bring you a tribute of the admi- 
ration of my country, of the great Empire which I represent 
here. They bow with me before your sacrifice and before your 
glory. Once again, for the defense of the great cause with 
which its very future is bound up, mankind turns to France." 

The immediate result of this sacrifice was to make possible 
the battle of the Somme. 

The Somme. — The new British armies, in concert with the 
French army, attacked in July, 1916. It is now known that 
this offensive brought Germany to the verge of ruin and that 
the German General Staff later admitted its material and moral 
inferiority in the course of the battle. Moreover, it was imme- 
diately after our victorious offensive on the Somme that the so- 
called Hindenburg line was constructed and that the Germans 
decided to retreat to that line rather than accept another battle 
as costly as the one just concluded at the beginning of the win- 
ter of 1916-17. 

1917. — At the beginning of the year 1917 the Anglo-French 



armies were in the fulness of their power. Unfortunately, 
owing to the lack of unity of command, several battles were 
fought instead of one single battle. Each was glorious, but 
none brought a decisive result. The battle of the Aisne, the 
English offensive at Vimy and at La Bassee, the local offensive 
at Verdun, the battle of attrition at Ypres, in which the French 
army collaborated, the offensive at La Malmaison on October 
23rd, the stabilization of the Italian front after the disaster of 
Caporetto — ^all these efforts were lacking in harmony, for want 
of unified command. It must be added that they encountered 
stronger and stronger German resistance, the internal situation 
in Russia enabling Germany to transfer a constant succession of 
new divisions to the western front. 

1918.— Thus in 1918 the German General Staff had at its 
disposal 195 divisions on the western front and was soon to have 
as many as 205. It sought a quick decision : to separate the Brit- 
ish and French armies, to threaten Paris, and to destroy the 
British army. 

On March 21 a mass of 64 divisions attacked the British 
ai-my, which had but 19 divisions in line and 13 in reserve. The 
fifth British army was compelled to give ground, involving the 
third in its retreat. Noyon was lost, Paris uncovered. On the 
evening of the 26th the separation of the British and the French 
was all but accomplished. 

Confronted by this grave situation, the allied Governments, 
recognizing the inefficiency of understandings between independ- 
ent commanders-in-chief, decided to entrust to General Foch the 
supreme command of the Allied forces in France. In less than 
a week General Foch re-established and thenceforward main- 
tained the liaison between the British and French armies, and 
arrested the enemy's offensive in Picardy before it had reached 
its first strategic objective, Amiens. 

On March 27th General Pershing chivalrously placed his 
troops at the disposal of General Foch. One division was sent 



into battle ; the others took up positions in defensive sectors, re- 
placing French divisions. 

Held in Picardy, the enemy immediately attempted to break 
the British front further north, at first in the Portuguese sector, 
then to the south of Ypres, this time aiming directly at the mari- 
time bases. He was successfully resisted and finally checked by 
British reinforcements and by a French army transported to 
Flanders. By April, the front wa,s again stabilized. 

But owing to the depletion of the British effectives and to 
the lengthening of the French front by sixty miles, the numer- 
ical superiority remained with the 205 German divisions, a 
superiority which the American reinforcements had not yet over- 
come, for despite the effective working of the transport service, 
only the four divisions of the first American army corps were 
immediately available. Accordingly, on May 27th, by a violent 
surprise attack, the enemy reached Chateau-Thierry. The ar- 
rival of American reserves enabled Foch on June 2nd to arrest 
this attack between the Aisne and the Marne, and on June 9th to 
prevent an attempt to pierce the line north of Compi^gne. 

By June 15th the new front was stabilized. But the Ger- 
mans were in possession of a good base for further attacks, only 
fifty miles from Paris. The Allied losses were serious. To com- 
pensate for these, Pershing arranged with Foch to place a cer- 
tain number of American divisions provisionally at the disposal 
of the French army, and began the organization of a first Amer- 
ican army, speeding up the training of the troops. The Allied 
command grouped its reserves behind the Marne and Champagne 
front, where the indications were that a new attack was being 
planned for an early date, and prepared a counter-offensive on 
a front of twenty-five miles from the Aisne to Belleau Wood. 

On July 15th the expected attack was launched. It encoun- 
tered stubborn resistance on the part of General Gouraud's army, 
and was consequently unable to profit by its slight advance south 
of the Marne. On the 18th, Generals Mangin and Degoutte, 



aided by the gallant American divisions, resumed the offensive. 
That date, July 18th, was the starting-point of the general 
Allied offensive, which did not cease until it had gained the 
victory. 

In the Near East. — In addition to the prolonged effort of 
France on the western front, it is necessary to recall the French 
effort in the Near East. Besides her co-operation at the Darda- 
nelles and in Palestine, besides the war material — rifles, cannon, 
ammunition — sent in great quantity to Russia and to Rou- 
mania, France sent an army of 200,000 men to Salonica and 
maintained them there. No measure could have been more bur- 
densome, but none was more far-sighted or more efficacious. 
Despite the risks of navigation in the Mediterranean, reinforce- 
ments were constantly sent to make good the losses caused by 
warfare and by disease. Further, France collected the Serbian 
army at Corfu after its retreat from Serbia, saved it from 
typhus, reorganized it, equipped it, and transported it, 120,000 
strong, to Salonica in 1916. The defection of Bulgaria was the 
direct result of the Salonica expedition, and we know the conse- 
quences of that defection in Turkey, in Hungary, in Austria, 
and in Germany. 

The French Navy During the War. — ^At the beginning of 
August, 1914, nearly all the French naval units were concen- 
trated in the Mediterranean Sea, while the British fleet was to 
guard the North Sea, the Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean. 
After assuring the transportation of many African troops, 
which proved to be an efficient reinforcement in the first battles 
of the war, the French Fleet, 20 dreadnoughts and 10 cruisers 
strong, bombarded the Dalmatian coast (August 16, 1914), 
shelled the Cattaro moorings (October 18, 1914), and blockaded 
the Straits of Otranto. Then, in 1915, the concentration at 
Corfu and the transportation to Salonica in 1916 of the 
Serbian Army, after its retreat from Serbia, was due to tlie 
French Navy. 



After contributing to the expedition in the Dardanelles, 
and the shipment of Anglo-French troops from Gallipoli to Sa- 
lonica, the French Navy turned to the less glorious, but no less 
useful task of protecting against hostile submarines the trans- 
portation of troops and supplies. 

Meanwhile, it kept the Syrian harbors closed to the Germans, 
and later on convoyed the French contingents to Palestine. 

The naval demonstrations on the Greek coasts (bombardment 
of Cavalla, August, 1916; blockade of the Greek coasts and 
moorings at Salamis, September, 1916) finally enabled Mr. 
Jonnart, High Commissioner of the Entente, to bring about the 
abdication of Constantine, and to re-establish in Greece — with 
Venizelos — ^a government free from any German influence. 

The French Navy was able, besides, to send to the front the 
naval fusiliers, who fought for two days and nights to cover the 
retreat of the Belgian army from Antwerp to the Yser, and 
then held up the Germans at Dixmude for twenty-six days. Two 
thousand naval gunners and thirty thousand sailors were dis- 
tributed among different units, and their gallantry made all 
those detachments (and more particularly the fusiliers) as re- 
nowned in France as the Marines are in the United States. 

Finally, France took an important part in the methodical 
struggle against the German submarines; the merchant marine 
w^as carefully convoyed by warships and airplanes; trawlers 
armed with cannon were engaged in the daily pursuit of U-boats. 
This silent, endless task may be compared to the long guard the 
Allied armies had to mount during the years of trench warfare 
— a life of continuous risk without battles or glory ; but the ac- 
complishment of that thankless duty contributed to secure the 
supremacy of the seas, which finally brought about victory. 

II. — The Organization of the Feench Effort 

Mobilization. — It will be understood that to support so great 
an effort upon the several fronts, France found it necessary to 



mobilize all her available classes. Since August, 1914, 7,500,000 
Frenchmen have been called to the colors, one-fifth of the total 
population of the country. The like proportion would give the 
United States an army of 21,000,000 men. The losses have 
been heavy. Up to November 1, 1918, France had 1,327,800 
killed in action, dead of wounds, or missing; nearly 700,000 
crippled and pensioned, out of 3,000,000 wounded. In spite 
of these losses there were 3,000,000 French soldiers on the 
various fronts and 113 divisions in France on November 11, 
1918. It is not diminishing the part played by the British 
or the Americans or the Italians — ^the services rendered by each 
of these have been in many ways valuable, indispensable — to 
conclude that the French army has constantly been the pivot 
of all the strategic combinations on the western front. 

The Indtcstrial Effort. — So formidable a military and naval 
effort requires for its support a corresponding industrial effort 
behind the firing line. The mobilization had taken from the 
factories the greater part of their youngest and most active 
workmen ; the invasion had deprived the country not only of the 
mining district of Briey but of the rich industrial and mining 
region of the North. Yet France, though mutilated, was capable 
of organizing the labor of her industries in the measure revealed 
by the following figures: 

Munitions and Artillery Material. — For every 100 rifles she 
made at the beginning of 1914, France made in 1918 29,000; 
for every 100 machine-guns, 7,000. She has been able to furnish 
to her Allies 1,350,000 rifles; 15,000 automatic rifles; 10,000 
machine-guns; 200,000,000 cartridges, at the same time main- 
taining and increasing her own armament notwithstanding 
losses. To-day, in place of two St. Etienne machine-guns, each 
battalion has twelve Hotchkiss machine-guns. 

In this war of armament, the production of artillery has 
reached unheard-of proportions. In August, 1914, the daily 
production of 75-millimeter shells in the French factories was 



13,000 ; in 1918 it was 180,000. Their daily production of shells 
of large caliber wais 100,000, and in particular 45,000 of 155 
millimeters as against 200 in August, 1914. It has been neces- 
sary not only to replace the 75's lost and destroyed, but to in- 
crease the supply of this arm, and to furnish it to the Allies 
(especially to the American army, whose entire field artillery is 
at present of French manufacture). It has also been necessary 
to create for France a heavy artillery (France has 6,000 heavy 
guns, as against 300 at the beginning of the war), and to fur- 
nish heavy artillery, especially 155-millimeter cannon, to the 
Allies (Russia, Roumania, the United States). In 1918 the 
French factories turned out each day 60 cannon of all calibers. 
The French army alone is provided with 17,000 cannon and 
6,000 trench mortars and light field mortars (mortiers d'accom- 
pagnement). 

TanJcs {Artillery of Assault). — Here it has not been enough 
to improve and develop; it has been necessary to create. After 
the English had tested the first types of heavy tanks, and France 
had in 1917 followed their example, she turned her efforts in 
another direction. The light tank, highly mobile, easily con- 
cealed, armed either with a 37-millimeter gun or with a machine- 
gun, and carrying a crew of only two men, the "baby Renault," 
is a French conception. It has proved its worth on the battle- 
fields of 1918 and has been one of the niost valuable arms in the 
decisive combats. To give an idea of the industrial effort in- 
volved, it is sufficient to say that in the spring of 1918 the pro- 
duction of light tanks had reached an average of 150 to 160 a 
month. 

Aviation. — The aviation service also had to be created. Com- 
pare with the 100 or more airplanes of touring type which the 
French army had in August, 1914, the 4,000 war airplanes, 
equipped with all modem apparatus and powerfully armed, 
which France now has in service. The present planes have a 
speed of 150 miles an hour and can climb to 20,000 feet in 18 



minutes. The giant bombing planes, furnished with 2, 3, or 4 
motors of 450 horsepower each, carry a load of two tons, and 
can fly for six hours at 110 miles an hour; these are the planes 
which have bombed German cities in reprisal for the German 
raids on Paris and other French cities. France manufactured 
p 7,000 motors a month, many of which were furnished to her 

Allies. The manufacture of planes has been developed to a 
still higher output. 

A Few Figures. — ^A few statistics will enable the reader to 
form an estimate of the industrial effort of France. In 1914, 
France's daily production of steel, with all her blast furnaces 
operating, was only 13,500 tons, while th-at of Germany was 
42,500. Moreover, the retreat of August, 1914, left in the 
enemy's possession mines and factories, three-fourths of the 
French resources in iron and coal, four-fifths of the French re- 
sources in cast iron, steel, and coke. Schroeder, the President 
of the Grerman Metallurgical Association, announced in Janu- 
ary, 1915: "Out of 127 blast furnaces in France, hardly 30 are 
producing cast iron; 95 are in the war zone." France set her 
hand to the task: new mines were developed; water-power was 
brought into service; new factories were estabhshed. The num- 
ber of workers in her steel and iron plants, compared with the 
number of workers before the war, and which in August, 1914, 
had fallen to 33 per cent, had by July, 1917, risen to 173 per 
cent. Women operatives had largely replaced the men, who 
were standing guard in the trenches. 

The Agricultural Effort. — The agricultural effort of France 
was equal to her industrial one. The task was difficult : the peas- 
ants formed the great mass of the army ; out of 8,000,000 em- 
ployed in farming in 1914, 2,555,000 were mobilized. Besides 
the needs of the army, the occupation of part of the territory 
by the enemy brought about a great decrease in stock (10,000, 
000 sheep instead of 16,000,000; 12,000,000 oxen instead of 
14,000,000; 2,000,000 horses instead of 3,000,000; 4,000,000 



swine instead of 7,000,000). Fertilizers were lacking; tiie out- 
put of sulphate of ammonia had fallen from 100,000 tons to 
28,000 ; all the nitrate of soda available was used for the manu- 
facture of powder. Therefore, 60,000 farms were abandoned 
in France, and the war wheat crop was less than the average 
pre-war crop. 

A great effort was made: men were replaced by machines; 
4,000 agricultural tractors are now used in France. Here, 
again, the French women did their bit, while their husbands, 
their fathers, their sons were in the trenches. 

The output of superphosphates from Tunis and Algiers in- 
creased from 600,000 tons to 800,000. The abandoned farms 
were sold to new farmers, with the result that France, before 
long, will have reached in the production of cereals her pre-war 
figure of 90,000,000 quintals. Despite her many wounds, the 
soil of France retains its fertility. 

The Fmancial Effort of Frcmce. — The industrial and agri- 
cultural effort could not have been sustained without a corre- 
sponding financial effort. Notwithstanding the loss of the 
regions of the North, which paid 25 per cent of the total amount 
of French taxes, the citizens of France were in 1918 paying to 
the State $50 for each man, woman, and child — a total amount 
of $1,651,376,000, i.e., more than twice what they paid before 
the war ($765,779,816 annually). The total war taxes have 
given to the State since August, 1914, $4,464,220,182. 

Along with this taxation, the three war loans of 1915, 1916, 
1917 realized $5,882,935,780, and the fourth loan of Novem- 
ber, 1918, amounted to $3,944,954,128, an average of $128 
per inhabitant. 

The sum of $4,978,333,027 was obtained through short-term 
Treasury notes. 

Allied and foreign countries loaned to France $4,711,736,880 

(the United States $2,181,121,835; England, $2,303,289,358). 

The Banks of France and Algeria advanced $3,562,385,321. 



$23,599,611,190 was thus raised, enabling France to meet all 
her war expenses, which have amounted to $23,486,238,552. 

French Women During the War, — These statements would 
be neither complete nor fair without a few remarks about the 
part played by the women of France during this war. In the 
absence of all the best of her manhood, the activity of women 
was one of the most wonderful achievements of France. The 
French women, prepared to play their social part in the strug- 
gle by the powerfxil feminine organizations which existed before 
the war, were ready everywhere to do their duty. 

In education, thousands of young women took the place of 
schoolmasters or of high-school teachers (12,600 of them en- 
deavored to fill the places left vacant by 30,000 men) ; in the 
railroad administration they count more than 15,000; in the 
banks, in transportation (Metropolitan and Nord-Sud subways, 
street-cars), their work is especially successful; moreover, they 
work in all the Government offices, including the War Office and 
the barracks (150,000 in the army services and in administra- 
tive work). 

Women have been members of town councils. Some of them, 
as Mme. Macherez, "the Mayor of Soissons," have struck the 
Germans with amazement by their intelligence and their firm- 
ness ; others, most of them teachers in the schools, became secre- 
taries or chief clerks to the mayors, and ruled vast townships 
with the same genius as their own home. The French Red Cross 
is entirely organized and managed by women. In 1914, there 
were 250,000 members, with a capital of $6,000,000 for 600 
hospitals. 

Thanks to the efforts of the Secretary for Armament and 
the Assistant for Ammunition, women were employed in all the 
war industries; to protect them against all risks, to secure them 
good wages and good health, a Committee on Women's Work 
was created, whose efforts have brought into the war industries 
more than half a million of women. 



For every two women working before the war, there were 
in January, 1918, 781 in iron works, 148 in chemical works, 830 
in transportation, 161 in wood works. 111 in leather, 104 in 
rubber, paper, pasteboard factories, 102 in various other trades. 
Altogether, in agriculture, trade, administration, war industries, 
more than one million and a half women were engaged in war 
work. Their effort deserves the admiration of the world, for 
their share is great in our common victory. 

Conclusion 

The spectacle afforded by France at war and by France at 
work suffices to prove the vitality of the race. Who was it that 
spoke of "the decadence of France".'^ There is both good and 
evil in everything, and this war itself, with all its atrocities, its 
massacres, and its devastations, will have conferred a benefit in 
revealing the moral value of individuals and of peoples. To- 
day France recalls with emotion all the great spirits who in other 
lands have refused to doubt her worth, the writers and artists 
who in her darkest hours have proclaimed their faith in her. 
She thanks the American poet Whitman for having had the con- 
fidence to predict in 1871 what the victory of to-day is about 
to bring to pass : 

"Again thy star, O France, fair, lustrous star. 
In heavenly peace, clearer, more bright than ever 
Shall beam immortal." 




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